Expansionist China’s Expanding Hegemonic Ambitions and Maritime Disputes
Introduction
In 2021, this author’s article on Chinese naval expansion in the Indian Ocean Region provided a comprehensive overview of China’s growing maritime ambitions and its strategic moves to establish a more dominant presence in the region. Since then, Chinese maritime strategy has expanded significantly in not just the Indian Ocean but also in the geopolitically volatile South China Sea (SCS). Both these maritime domains are geopolitically-contested thanks to China.
The recent developments in the SCS highlights China’s relentless pursuit of regional hegemony through a combination of naval, Coast Guard, and paramilitary maritime forces. This pursuit is linked with its ambition to become a maritime great power (MGP), first articulated in its 2019 Defense White Paper. The White Paper marks a significant pivot towards enhancing China’s naval capabilities while outlining China’s goal to establish itself as the dominant maritime force by 2050. It reflects a clear intent to assert Chinese influence over key maritime regions and sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) that has been realised through aggressive policies and strategic initiatives aimed at expanding its reach and control over vital maritime areas.
This follow-up article delves into these recent developments, emphasising China’s hegemonic maritime ambitions, the multitude of disputes it has on the high seas with every country in the SCS and the sophisticated grey-zone warfare tactics it employs. It also sheds light on how China’s neighbouring countries have grown increasingly resistant to its coercive tactics and are taking significant steps to push back.
The Nine-Dash Line and Territorial Disputes
Chinese strategy in the SCS revolves around the nine-dash line, a demarcation that covers nearly the entire SCS and stretches over 2,000 kilometres from the Chinese mainland. This claim overlaps with the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of several Southeast Asian countries. While China uses the nine-dash line to stake its claim over the SCS, it has always maintained deliberate ambiguity as to what the line represents. The Chinese claim was rejected by The Hague’s the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016 but China continues to aggressively assert its claims despite this ruling.
China-Philippines Disputes
Ayungin/Scarborough Shoal: Given its strategic location, the Ayungin Shoal has become a significant flashpoint between China and the Philippines. Beijing’s 2012 annexation of it has given China a crucial vantage point to monitor and control maritime traffic in the region. On 17th June 2024, the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) intercepted a rotation and resupply (RORE) mission for Filipino troops manning the BRP Sierra Madre (LS-57) in Ayungin Shoal in the West Philippine Sea (WPS). For two key reasons, Indian reportage has framed this clash as the ‘maritime Galwan’: the nature of the weapons used by the Chinese as well as the timing. During Galwan, the Chinese used metal-spiked clubs and rods wrapped in barbed wire while in the WPS, axes and spears were used. The Galwan Valley clash occurred on 15th/16th June 2020 while the WPS clash was on 17th June 2024. Another point of commonality of the Ayungin Shoal clash pertains to the United States. The day after the clash – on 18th June 2024 – the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) welcomed the US 7th Fleet Commander.
Spratly Islands: The Spratly archipelago (composed of numerous small islands, reefs, and atolls) is another critical area of contention. Believed to be rich in natural resources, these islands are strategically-located near crucial sea lines of communication (SLOCs). In addition to the commonalties highlighted above regarding the Ayungin/Scarborough Shoal, another interesting commonality is that one day after 17th June 2024, the CIA updated its World Factbook page on the Spratly Islands. By establishing a military presence on these islands, China is projecting hard power across the South China Sea in an attempt to deter rival claimants from challenging its hegemony. The militarisation of these islands – including the construction of runways and other military infrastructure – serves to strengthen Beijing’s strategic depth in the region.
China-Vietnam Disputes
Paracel Islands: Located closer to Vietnam, the Paracel Islands have been under Chinese control ever since China won the ‘Battle of the Paracel Islands’ in 1974. While the Paracel Archipelago has more than 100 coral islands, reefs and banks distributed across nearly 9,500 squares kilometres of maritime area almost equidistant from China’s Hainan Island and the Vietnamese port of Da Nang, the total land area is about three square miles. These islands are of geostrategic and military importance as it can accommodate a forward base to conduct a significant military manoeuvre targeting either the Indo-China Peninsula or controlling the SLOCs in the SCS.Control over the Paracels enables the Chinese to extend its military to expand its area of influence and secure its southern maritime borders.
Spratly Islands: While both China and Vietnam claim the Paracel Islands, China exercises control over the them. As the islands were returned to China as its territory ever since the ever since the Japanese defeat in 1945, China has claimed the Spratly Islands as its own. The United Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office note published in 1974 – serving as an authoritative and trusted source – had not found any sign that the islands were ever the territory of another state. Vietnam began claiming the Spratly Islands as its territory form 1997 onwards in response to what it considered overlapping claims in the South China Sea. Vietnam currently occupies 25 features in the Spratly Islands. The ongoing militarisation of these islands by China, including the construction of runways and other military infrastructure, serves to strengthen Beijing’s strategic depth in the region.
China-Malaysia Dispute: China’s claims overlap with Malaysia’s EEZ, particularly around the natural gas- and oil-rich Luconia Shoals, divided into North and South Luconia Shoal. China considers James Shoal in the South Luconia Shoal as its southernmost territory. James Shoal as well as the Luconia Shoals as a whole remain submerged at high tide. Therefore, they are a part of Malaysia’s continental shelf and cannot be claimed as Chinese territory. By asserting control over these areas, China aims to secure vital energy resources and exert influence over Malaysia’s maritime activities. But more importantly, this is another Chinese ploy to establish administrative control across the nine-dash line. This control is crucial for Beijing’s long-term energy security and economic growth.
China-Indonesia Dispute: China’s claims in the southern reaches of the SCS overlap with Indonesia’s EEZ around the Natuna Islands. Three reasons for friction between China and Indonesia could possibly include the 1973 discovery of the East Natuna block of gas reserves, its subsequent auction in May 2023 to Indonesia’s Pertamina Hulu Indonesia and reports from 2022 which suggested that Indonesia was considering establishing the Natuna Islands as a Special Economic Zone. By pressing its claim on the Natuna Islands, China seeks to expand its influence and secure additional energy resources critical for sustaining its economic growth and military modernisation. Aggressive posturing by Chinese vessels in this region has led to numerous confrontations with Indonesian forces.
China-Brunei Dispute: Although Brunei’s territorial claims are not as significant in comparison to the above-stated disputes, they are equally significant due to its resource-rich EEZ. Brunei is one state that does not take much offence to Chinese maritime actions within its EEZ. Chinese maritime forces do transit through Brunei’s waters but Brunei does not take any action whatsoever, either in pursuit of the vessels or in defiance to China. There are two key reasons for the lack of Bruneian action against China: Brunei joined the Belt and Road Initiative in 2017 and China is one of Brunei’s leading two-way trade partners. The fact that this can be seen as a sign Brunei is in China’s sphere of economic influence when Brunei did not respond to Chinese vessels sailing through Bruneian waters is not a good sign. Although, an alternate view puts Brunei’s foreign policy as calculated. China’s claims in Brunei’s EEZ is part of a broader strategy to dominate the resource base of the SCS and ensure that Beijing can leverage these assets for economic and strategic purposes.
Taiwan: A Critical Node in the South China Sea
While Taiwan is not a formal claimant in the disputes in the region, its status is inherently linked to Beijing’s ambitions. China views Taiwan as a breakaway province that must be reunified with the mainland, by force if necessary. Control over the South China Sea and particularly over the areas around Taiwan, will provide China with a significant strategic advantage, enhancing its ability to project power and potentially isolate Taiwan from international support. The strategic importance of Taiwan is underscored by the frequent military drills and incursions by Chinese forces around the island.
Conclusion: The Expanding Web of Maritime Disputes
China’s maritime ambitions in the South China Sea highlight a complex and multifaceted strategy aimed at securing its dominance in this crucial region. By aggressively asserting its claims through the nine-dash line, China has not only intensified territorial disputes with neighbouring countries but has also showcased its willingness to employ instruments of both conventional and unconventional warfare to achieve its goals. One such instrument of unconventional warfare is its grey-zone operations by its maritime militia, which will be discussed in the next article of this four-part series.
