Integral analysis of the venezuelan military and state aviation.
Nicolás Maduro’s recent operational assertion regarding the operability of their U.S.-made F-16s invites a deeper examination of the Venezuelan Air Force, which is facing multiple structural and operational challenges. An unnamed high-ranking Venezuelan General Officer, in conversation with Infobae, provided a critical perspective that underscores the complexity of the environment in which Venezuelan military aviation operates.
Operational and Structural Context
The Venezuelan Air Force has suffered a notable deterioration in its operational capacity, influenced by poor internal management, an unprecedented economic crisis, and the restrictions imposed by U.S. sanctions. The lack of adequate maintenance, the reduction of specialized human talent, and the degradation of logistical infrastructure have created a scenario where Maduro’s assertion about the effectiveness of the F-16s becomes questionable. Although some aircraft may be in flight, their operability is limited and does not reflect an optimal state. However, any fighter able to sortie with weapons onboard remains a threat to any opposing force.
The Role of Iran and Other Actors in Supply
One of the most significant aspects is the involvement of Iran and other actors in supplying critical parts and components to the Venezuelan Air Force. Despite sanctions imposed by the United States, multiple avenues have been identified through which the Venezuelan regime has managed to evade and circumvent restrictions. Iran, in particular, has played a key role in maintaining the operability of Venezuela’s weapon systems. Open sources claim that Hugo Chavez may have been involved in secretly providing an F-16 aircraft to Iran in the early to mid-2000s, as well as providing access to the airframe’s components and onboard weapons to Iranian military personnel.
Strategic Cooperation with Iran: Since at least 2018, Iran has been present at the Libertador Air Base (ICAO: SVBL), where studies have been conducted with the U.S.-manufactured C-130 Hercules and F-16 aircrafts. This cooperation has allowed Iranian technicians ample access to perform tests and modifications on the aircraft, suggesting an exchange of knowledge and technology that could be crucial for maintaining the operability of these systems. Iran has gained much experience in operating and maintaining their U.S. manufactured aircraft in their air order of battle, including the Grumman F-14 Tomcats, the Lockheed P-3 Orion, and C-130 Hercules. Iran has relied mainly on the black market to maintain a continued source of parts available to support its military readiness and aviation efforts. An Iranian network operating in the United States was able to successfully acquire F-14 parts and components from the Defense Reutilization Marketing Office (DRMO) public sales and ship them to Iran for years without detection.
Commercial Triangulation: The Venezuelan Air Force has explored various strategies to obtain spare parts through black market networks of intermediaries. This triangulation process involves using front companies and clandestine transactions allowing critical components delivered to Venezuela without attracting the unwarranted attention of U.S. authorities. Iran’s ability to produce parts and its experience in military supply have been leveraged by the Venezuelan regime.
Alliances with Other Countries: In addition to Iran, countries like Turkey have expressed an interest in cooperating with Venezuela in the military sphere. Reports indicate that Turkey, a NATO member, not only produces parts and components for the F-16 but has also developed its own aircraft manufacturing program, which could facilitate access to the technology and parts that the Venezuelan regime needs.
Geopolitical and Economic Implications
The supply of parts and strategic equipment to the Venezuelan Air Force and state owned fleet aircraft through these channels poses not only legal and ethical challenges in the context of sanctions but also significant geopolitical implications. The military cooperation between Venezuela and Iran, in particular, has raised concerns for the United States and its allies, who view this relationship as a potential link between terrorism and drug trafficking. The Venezuelan F-16s have long been directly involved in conducting day and night aerial intercept as well as conducting dissuasive and lethal shooting of suspect aircrafts in drug related operations.
Additionally, the costs associated with obtaining parts through unofficial channels can be exorbitant, further highlighting the fragility of Venezuela’s economic situation. Dependence on these supply methods not only jeopardizes the sustainability of the air force’s operability but also limits its ability to modernize and maintain its fleet effectively.
The Narrative of Resistance
Maduro’s discourse, framed within a narrative of resistance against imperialism, seeks to mobilize internal support and divert attention from the regime’s structural failures. However, this rhetoric may prove counterproductive if not accompanied by concrete actions to address the operational realities of the Venezuelan Air Force. Ignoring the degradation of the air force and its dependence on external actors could weaken the government’s legitimacy in the long term.
Another issue is the case of individuals who have attempted to violate U.S. imposed sanctions by procuring and sending parts for Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) state-owned aircraft. The Department of Justice (USDOJ) charged ten individuals, including Venezuelans, Spaniards, and Costa Ricans, with evading sanctions against PDVSA through the illegal exportation of U.S. aircraft parts. The charges include conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), with a potential sentence of up to 20 years in prison if convicted.
Notable among the accused are:
1. George Clemente Semerene Quintero: Arrested at Miami International Airport.
2. Gilberto Ramón Araujo Prieto: Air transportation manager at PDVSA.
3. Guillermo Ysrael Marval Rivero and Fernando José Blequett Landaeta: Air transportation managers and logistics analysts at PDVSA.
4. Luis Alberto Duque Carvajal: Owner of Novax Group SA.
5. Juan Carlos González Pérez: Owner of Aerofalcon SL.
The accused allegedly concealed that the parts including Honeywell engines were intended for PDVSA, exporting them through intermediary companies in other countries to avoid U.S. sanctions. They are also charged with providing false export information and smuggling goods.
Furthermore, the Department of Justice indicates that they lacked authorization to export goods to PDVSA, violating sanctions imposed by the United States. These sanctions appear to have disrupted and caused significant losses for the Venezuelan state-owned aircraft. PDVSA heavily relies on its own fleet of aircraft to conduct its business and to fly to destinations that support the Venezuelan regime. This particular case exposed the deteriorating rate of the state’s owned large Bombardier LearJet fleet.
The issue of violations of the restriction on sales of arms and strategic parts to Venezuela is complex and has involved several actors over the years. Below are some highlighted examples of criminal cases and related situations:
1. Case of the Warplanes: In 2014, the Department of Justice charged several individuals and companies with smuggling military aircraft parts to Venezuela. According to the accusations, these parts were for the Venezuelan F-16 fighter aircraft program. Among those accused was American businessman William A. Heller, who was arrested for attempting to illegally send aircraft parts to Venezuela through a Miami-based company.
2. Operation Cobra (2015): This operation uncovered a network trafficking arms and military parts that included sending components from the United States to Venezuela. It was discovered that some of these shipments were destined for the Venezuelan Air Force. The operation led to the indictment of several individuals, including Venezuelans residing in the United States, although not all names were publicly disclosed.
3. Case of the Embargo Violation (2016): In 2016, a network was exposed that was sending replacement parts for combat aircraft to Venezuela, violating embargo laws. Investigations indicated that some of these shipments originated from companies in Eastern European countries. Several international companies were involved, but specific names of individuals were not always disclosed due to the nature of the investigations.
4. Reports of Arms Trafficking from Iran (2018-2020): During this period, reports indicated that Iran was sending military parts and technology to Venezuela, despite U.S. sanctions. This included the transfer of parts for aircraft and other strategic equipment. Although many details about the individuals involved in these transactions are not public, the U.S. government has pointed to key figures within Maduro’s regime as the main beneficiaries of these transactions.
5. Arms Smuggling Network with Connections to Russia (2020): In 2020, smuggling networks were identified that allegedly received arms and military parts from Russia and sent them to Venezuela, violating international sanctions. Although investigations revealed connections with Venezuelan government officials, specific names of individuals involved in the smuggling were not widely disclosed.
These examples illustrate how, over the years, there have been attempts to evade sanctions against Venezuela. The clandestine nature of these operations complicates the acquisition of detailed and complete information about all those involved. Investigations continue, and the international community remains vigilant regarding these acts that violate international arms trade laws.
Conclusion
The situation of the Venezuelan military and state aviation programs reflects the complex intersection of internal politics, the economy, and international dynamics. The regime’s ability to keep its F-16s and C-130/ in the highest state of readiness, through cooperation with black market actors and U.S. enemies demonstrates adaptability amid restrictions. However, this strategy poses significant risks in terms of sustainability and geopolitical repercussions. Venezuela’s Air Force and state owned aircraft fleet faces an uncertain future, and the narrative of resistance cannot obscure the operational realities that require urgent attention. On the other hand, it is very possible that Venezuelan U.S. manufactured military and corporate state owned aircraft fleets can continue to operate through the black acquisition market if the United States isn’t able to enforce sanctions and restrictions.
By, William Acosta, NYPD, (Ret), Steve Tochterman, FAA, (Ret), Jesús Daniel Romero, USN, (Ret)
- Credits:
This analysis is based on information gathered from various sources, including Infobae and reports from the U.S. Department of Justice, as well as investigations into military cooperation between Venezuela and Iran. We thank all the media and experts whose contributions have been essential for understanding the complexity of the current situation of military and state aviation in Venezuela.
