Tren de Guayana has emerged as the dominant force in the clandestine realm of Venezuela’s illegal mining industry. El Tren de Guayana allegedly enjoys the support from President Nicolás Maduro’s administration to eliminate rivals and reinforce its control over the lucrative Bolívar state. The gang originated in 2007 as a street faction in the Vista al Sol neighborhood of San Félix, has undergone a dramatic transformation, establishing supremacy in El Callao, a mining town renowned for its rich gold deposits. This evolution has not come without its challenges; for two years, Tren de Guayana engaged in fierce battles with the Peru Syndicate, also known as the Toto and Zacarías gang, which held sway over the area from 2010 until 2022. Once again, this is evidence of Venezuela’s Maduro regime relationship with criminal organizations. This one is the relationship over Venezuela’s illegal gold mining operations and how this industry benefits the few and the regime’s elite.
Research from the think tank InSight Crime indicates that Tren de Guayana’s rise has been facilitated by strategic alliances with local security forces and the Maduro regime, allowing the gang to achieve unchallenged authority in El Callao (InSight Crime, 2023). The community has endured extreme violence during the gang’s ascent, culminating in massacres and public threats that have made headlines for years. The Peru Syndicate’s 12-year reign was characterized by deep roots in the local community, fostering a level of support that the newer gang had to overcome.
It has been common knowledge that Venezuela has long had an illegal gold mining problem going back almost 200 years. Venezuela’s army and National Guard were directly involved in identifying illegal gold mining operations ran by Colombians and Brazilians. In fact, Garimpeiro’s have been around for decades a term coined as a reference to small scale miner operation going back to the 1800s. Venezuelan military operations were swift and efficient in clearing many of these illegal operations. However, over the course of time, military personnel were bribed and many of them actually provided security and later owned illegal mining sites.
In 2017 the Maduro’s regime initiated security operations against the Peru Syndicate, which had refused to align with the regime’s interests. This crackdown was met with fierce resistance from the Syndicate, which even released videos condemning state actions (Teixeira, 2024). Capitalizing on the weakening of its rival, Tren de Guayana exploited the chaos between 2014 and 2019, leading to a spike in violence that earned El Callao the notorious title of the most dangerous town in Venezuela, with a staggering homicide rate of 620 per 100,000 residents.
In 2021, the R Organization sought to reclaim its stake in El Callao, reigniting its rivalry with Tren de Guayana. A temporary truce was brokered with the assistance of the Venezuelan Mining Corporation (CVM), adding another layer of complexity to the criminal landscape in the region. As of late 2022, the Peru Syndicate suffered devastating losses, including the capture of its key leaders, Eleomar Vargas Vargas (alias “Zacarías”) and Alejandro Rafael Ochoa Sequea (alias “Toto”), effectively leading to their expulsion from El Callao.
With the Peru Syndicate’s exit, many miners in El Callao have reported a notable decline in violence. One miner shared, “The group who used to have control here was very dangerous. Whoever did not pay was killed” (Teixeira, 2024). This shift has been attributed to Tren de Guayana’s governance, which reportedly operates in collaboration with the Corporation Venezolana de Minería (CVM). However, the gang demands “taxation” or extortion fees from workers to allow their operations, with some miners suggesting that a portion of this revenue likely reaches government officials. Although there are allegations of collusion between Tren de Guayana and state forces, concrete evidence to substantiate these claims remains elusive.
Under the current leadership of Rony Jackson Colome Cruz, known as Rony Matón (Rony “The Killer”), Tren de Guayana solidified its power. Following the deaths of former leaders Gordo Bayón and Phanor Vladimir Sanclemente Ojeda (alias Capitán), Rony Matón has risen to prominence, orchestrating operations that extend beyond El Callao into other strategic areas such as Guasipati. Despite local airports being inactive, these areas serve as clandestine airstrips for gold shipments, further extending the gang’s reach.
Tren de Guayana is believed to composed of several hundred members organized in a structured hierarchy, allowing it to maintain a significant presence in the region. Key figures within the gang, such as “el Payaso,” “Arquimidito,” “el Morocho,” “el Danielito,” and “el Congo,” are instrumental in managing daily operations while enforcing territorial control. Their involvement in various criminal activities, including extortion, drug trafficking, and violent enforcement, underscores the gang’s multifaceted approach to maintaining power.
The alarming presence of heavy weaponry among gang members raises serious concerns about their operational capabilities. Reports of armed confrontations indicate that these groups are often better equipped than law enforcement, enabling them to operate with relative impunity. This imbalance perpetuates a cycle of violence that is difficult to disrupt.
The illegal gold mining sector in Venezuela has evolved into a complex web of organized crime, state complicity, and international trade, with significant implications for both local and global economies. The illegal nature of this mining is critical to understanding the broader context—Tren de Guayana operates outside the law, with little regard for environmental regulations or the rights of local populations. At the heart of this system is Tren de Guayana, which has exploited its ties to the Maduro regime to dominate the gold-rich territories of Bolívar state. Understanding who buys this gold, which countries benefit from its trade, and how Maduro’s regime utilizes proceeds is crucial to grasping the broader implications of Venezuela’s gold economy. In other words, El Tren de Guayana is a state sponsored criminal organization designed to enrich the Chavistas in power both civilian and military.
The primary buyers of Venezuelan gold are often foreign entities, including countries with less stringent regulations on the origin of gold and a high demand for precious metals. Notably, countries such as Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and various Asian nations have emerged as significant players in the gold trade. These nations have established channels through which they acquire gold from Venezuela, often disguising the origins of the metal to circumvent international sanctions imposed by the Maduro’s regime. The gold is frequently laundered through complex trade networks, allowing it to enter the global market without raising red flags. There is ample evidence of Venezuelan illegally exported or smuggled gold seized around the world.
Turkey has been particularly instrumental in facilitating the flow of Venezuelan gold. The country has become a key destination for gold exports, with significant amounts reportedly shipped from Venezuela directly to Turkish. This relationship has allowed the Maduro regime to generate revenue despite facing crippling sanctions on its oil exports and other economic activities. The gold trade serves as a critical financial lifeline for the Venezuelan government, providing much-needed liquidity to support its operations.
An interesting background illustrating the regime’s gold oversight to CVM. La Corporación Venezolana de Minería, S.A. (CVM) was created by Hugo Chavez in 2012 as a state corporation charged with the exploration, extraction, production, and other proceses related to mining. In September 2024, Venezuelan Mayor General Jose Santiago Moreno Martinez, was designated as CVM’s President by Venezuela’s Vice President Delcy Rodriguez. Moreno Martinez had been the former 2nd Commander of the Venezuelan Armed Forces (CEOFANB) which was charged with the destruction of clandestine airfields and illegal mining sites. Coincidentally, Delcy Rodriguez and her brother, Jorge Rodriguez, maintain regular visits to Turkey overseeing “joint business ventures.” While this may not mean much, much of the illegal and “legal” gold from Venezuela is exported to Turkey. So much so that Venezuela and Turkey signed an agreement to exploit gold in Venezuela in July 2024 perhaps as a result of international pressure of questionable practices and corruption related to Turkey’s role in Venezuelan gold.
Gold proceeds are utilized by the Maduro administration to fund various aspects of its governance, including social programs, military expenditures, and efforts to maintain control over the country amidst widespread dissent. The regime has strategically redirected these funds to bolster its support among key constituencies, ensuring loyalty from military and security forces that are essential for its survival. Additionally, the revenues are likely used to finance state-sponsored programs that aim to alleviate some of the economic hardships faced by the populace, albeit often in a manner that reinforces state control rather than fostering genuine development.
Moreover, the Maduro regime’s connections to organized crime groups like Tren de Guayana highlight a troubling synergy between state officials and criminal enterprises. This collaboration allows for a more streamlined operation in the illegal gold trade, where profits are funneled back into a system that supports both the gang’s activities and the regime’s agenda. The resulting cycle of violence, corruption, and economic exploitation not only destabilizes the local mining regions but also poses broader risks to regional security.
The international ramifications of this gold trade extend beyond Venezuela’s borders. Countries that engage in the acquisition of Venezuelan gold may inadvertently support human rights abuses and environmental degradation prevalent in the mining regions. The operations led by gangs such as Tren de Guayana are often marked by violence, extortion, and irreparable ecólogas and environmental damage, raising ethical concerns for nations involved in the trade. As awareness of these issues grows, there is increasing pressure on governments and corporations to ensure that their gold supply chains are free from complicity in such activities.
Strategic Ramifications
1. Organized Crime and State Complicity**: Tren de Guayana’s ties to the Maduro regime illustrate how organized crime can thrive in environments where state mechanisms are compromised. This relationship undermines the rule of law and can lead to increased civil unrest and instability, threatening the regime’s hold on power.
2. Impact on Local Communities**: Although the exit of the Peru Syndicate may have temporarily reduced violence, the ongoing extortion by Tren de Guayana continues to exploit local populations. This dependency on criminal organizations for economic stability stifles legitimate development and governance.
3. International Trade and Global Supply Chains**: The involvement of countries like Turkey in purchasing Venezuelan gold complicates international relations, especially for those enforcing sanctions. This may lead to diplomatic tensions and challenges in maintaining the integrity of international trade practices.
4. Human Rights Implications**: The gold trade is linked to numerous human rights abuses, raising ethical concerns for nations participating in this market. Increased scrutiny on supply chains may pressure governments and corporations to adopt more responsible sourcing practices.
5. Future of the Maduro Regime**: The regime’s reliance on gold revenues to fund its operations raises questions about its long-term viability. If international pressure escalates or gold supply chains are disrupted, the regime could face significant financial challenges, leading to increased instability.
In summary, the intricate dynamics of Venezuela’s illegal gold trade evidences a complex interplay of local crime, state interests, and international demand. Countries like Turkey and those in the Middle East play significant roles in purchasing Venezuelan gold, providing much-needed revenue to the Maduro regime. These proceeds are strategically utilized to sustain the government’s operations and maintain its grip on power while simultaneously perpetuating a cycle of violence and corruption. Addressing these challenges necessitates a concerted effort from the international community to scrutinize and regulate the gold supply chain, thereby holding accountable those who benefit from this illicit trade and the human suffering it engenders.
References:
Teixeira, M. (2024). Venezuelan Gang Allegedly Exploits Ties to Maduro for Illegal Mining Power. AFP
InSight Crime. (2023). “Venezuela’s Gold Mining: An Overview of the Criminal Landscape.” InSight Crime.
By: William L. Acosta NYPD Ret. And Jesus Romero US Navy Ret.
