Part 2: The Dark Triad of Chinese Grey-zone Warfare.
Introduction
According to the RAND Corporation, grey-zone tactics are “… coercive Chinese government geopolitical, economic, military, and cyber and information operations (cyber/IO) activities beyond regular diplomatic and economic activities and below the use of kinetic military force.” This article focuses on the coordinated use of China’s Navy, Coast Guard, Maritime Militia and fleet of research vessels as a characteristic of Chinese grey-zone warfare.
The above-stated tactics are utilised by China in combination with multi-domain and hybrid warfare. RAND goes on to state that Beijing has subjected India, the Philippines, Taiwan, Japan and Vietnam to nearly 80 different grey-zone tactics across all instruments of national power. Very literally, China is using all eggs in its basket but simultaneously filling up more baskets with more eggs. These tactics are grey because of three key reasons: the employment of unconventional forces, the employment of conventional forces unconventionally and the nature of the tactics.
China’s Three-pronged Maritime Strategy
China employs a sophisticated three-pronged strategy to assert its dominance in the South China Sea, involving the coordinated use of its Navy, Coast Guard and Maritime Militia. This three-pronged approach includes the military, maritime law enforcement and the maritime private militia. Additionally, there is also its fleet of research vessels. The three prongs and the fourth actor ensures that the line between military and research operations is and continues to remain blurred. The Chinese strategy is to maintain ambiguity in order to pursue its ambitions while maintaining plausible deniability and falls under China’s Three Warfares strategy. Simply put, it is war by other means: psychological, media and legal (lawfare) warfare. The Navy, Coast Guard, Maritime Militia and the fleet of research vessel are just four tools China utilises to conduct war by other means.
Navy: The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has undergone significant expansion and modernisation in recent years. Simply put, China has the world’s largest naval fleet: more than 370 ships and submarines, with over 140 major surface combatants. The PLAN plays a crucial role in asserting China’s territorial claims and conducting surveillance in contested waters. This includes the deployment of advanced warships, submarines and aircraft carriers of the South China Sea Fleet to project power and influence and deter potential adversaries. Most recently – the PLAN’s premier aircraft carrier – the Shandong – navigated through the Philippines Sea to join Russia in a joint exercise in the Pacific Ocean. This deployment is the Shandong Carrier Group’s first outside the South China Sea. Beijing is signalling to the Philippines, the US and to NATO. The Philippines due to its 17th June maritime clash, the US due to its significant presence in the region and NATO due to the recently concluded summit.
Coast Guard: The Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) acts as the enforcer of China’s maritime claims by engaging in overt acts of aggression and intimidation that are backed up by the PLAN on a case-by-case basis. The CCG is equipped with large, heavily-armed vessels that regularly patrol disputed areas, often leading to confrontations with the navies, coast guards and fishing vessels of other nations. If not for their PLAN markings, size, firepower and tactics, the CCG can be easily mistaken as naval warships. The most recent and well-documented confrontations include the blocking and harassment of Philippine vessels attempting to resupply the BRP Sierra Madre and the use of water cannons against Filipino fishing boats.
Maritime Militia: The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) comprises ostensibly civilian fishing vessels equipped and manned for military operations. These vessels operate alongside the PLAN and CCG, conducting surveillance, enforcing blockades, harassing foreign ships and maintaining an overt aggressive posture. The PAFMM’s activities often go unreported due to their ambiguous status, complicating international responses. Notable incidents include the harassment of the USNS Impeccable in 2009 and repeated blockades at the Second Thomas Shoal.
While there is more focus on the three aforementioned overt Chinese maritime actors, the fourth sails under the radar.
Dual-use ‘Research’ Vessels
China’s employment of dual-use research vessels adds another layer to its grey-zone tactics. These ‘civilian’ ships conduct scientific research while simultaneously gathering intelligence and supporting military operations. 50 out of 64 of these vessels are being utilised more for military purposes than civilian. This duality of approach allows China to expand its maritime presence under the guise of legitimate activities. It also prevents a military vessel from engaging with these research vessels. A few recent incidents involving these vessels have occurred. There are two signs that indicate the dual-use nature of a Chinese research vessel: if it is “…is owned and operated by a state-affiliated group with close ties to the Chinese military …that makes regular port calls at naval facilities …” and “… if [it] regularly goes dark before entering another country’s exclusive economic zone …”
Haiyang Dizhi 4 Hao (2024): The Haiyang Dizhi 4 Hao (HD 4 H) is a geological survey ship under the ownership of the Guangzhou Marine Geological Survey, which in turn is a department under the direct control of the Ministry of Natural Resources. It is believed that the HD 4 H entered the Philippines’ EEZ on 17th June 2024 and began surveying either off the Scarborough or Panatag Shoal, 175 nautical miles west of Luzon. This incident coincided with the recent and serious Sino-Filipino maritime clash. It not only showcases China’s employment of research vessels for strategic purposes but also Beijing’s political willingness, intent and capability to carry out its activities in multiple theatres simultaneously.
Shiyan 06 (October 2023): The Shiyan 06 is a scientific research vessel for geophysical exploration, seismic acquisition and processing. It is operated by the South China Sea Institute of Oceanology, which functions under the Chinese Academy of Science. The Academy in turn works closely with the Chinese military. In October 2023, the Shiyan 06 docked at Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port after conducting surveys along the island’s west coast, furthering China’s strategic interests in the Ocean Region (IOR). These surveys are just one type of case of Beijing’s expansionist actions in the
Hai Yang Shi You 760 (Summer 2019, December 2022): The Hai Yang Shi You 760 (HYSY 760) is a seismic survey ship capable of seeing through the seabed to identify oil and gas deposits. It is operated by China Oilfield Services Limited and in the summer of 2019, had conducted a survey off Newfoundland for Canada’s ION Geophysical Corporation. On 29 December 2023, it passed through the Strait of Malacca into the Indian Ocean for a gas and oil exploration mission within Bangladesh’s EEZ. The hydrographic data collected by the HYSY 760 is of great economic significance, it also has military value that is of a more nefarious nature. This knowledge is useful for undersea warfare and could also be used against maritime vessels by causing an undersea explosion.
Xiang Yang Hong 06 (December 2019): The Xiang Yang Hong 06 (XYH 06) is a research ship operated by China’s State Oceanic Administration (SOA), and the SOA is under the Ministry of Natural Resources. This vessel travelled over 10,000 kilometres in the Indian Ocean and in December 2019, had released a dozen advanced unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) – Sea Wing gliders – to create a profile of the underwater environment: the seabed, currents, salinity, density, resources, among others. Very similar type of Sea Wing gliders were also found close to Indonesia. Beijing’s employment of such UUV’s suggests four points: it is testing the performance of the gliders in different conditions and geographies, testing the instruments, collecting data and checking the data transmission back to the mothership. The XYH 06 is also one of 13 vessels that entered Taiwan’s EEZ between 2023 and February 2024. These operations contribute to a real-time ocean observation network, enhancing China’s maritime surveillance capabilities.
Strategic Implications of Grey-zone Warfare
China’s grey-zone tactics in the South China Sea have significant strategic implications. By blurring the lines between civilian, research, law enforcement and military operations, China is free to advance its territorial claims with minimal risk of direct military confrontation. These tactics simultaneously complicate international responses and undermine regional stability.
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR): The extensive use of dual-use research vessels allows China to gather critical data on oceanographic conditions, seabed topography and underwater resources. This information enhances the PLAN’s offensive capabilities, particularly when it comes to submarine warfare.
Economic Manipulation and Resource Control: By asserting control over resource-rich areas, China secures vital energy resources and fishing grounds. This economic manipulation supports China’s long-term strategic goals and exerts pressure on neighbouring countries dependent on these resources.
Plausible Deniability and Covert Operations: The involvement of purported civilian and research vessels in aggressive activities provides China with plausible deniability. This complicates attribution and international responses, allowing China to engage in covert operations in plain sight without provoking full-scale military conflicts.
Regional Power Dynamics: China’s grey-zone tactics challenge the sovereignty and security of neighbouring countries, altering regional power dynamics. The persistent harassment and intimidation of vessels of foreign states creates a climate of fear and uncertainty, compelling smaller nations to acquiesce to China’s demands.
Conclusion
The PLAN also has a history of employing uninvited signals and communications intelligence (SIGINT and COMINT respectively) ships to the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise. It has done so in 2012 (the US Navy statement has since been taken down), 2014, 2018, and in 2024, it will possibly send the Tianquanxing, its Type 815A electronic surveillance ship. Beijing will continue with such actions as it wishes to normalise these activities to create a new normal, making it difficult for states to challenge the new Chinese-established status quo. There is regional pushback against Chinese aggression, and this aspect is discussed in the third article of this four-part series.
